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THE SAGA CONTINUES – TRYING TO FIND A BALANCE IN
CERCLA’S PRP LIABILITY SUITS
ABSTRACT
This Note illustrates the enormous complexity and confusion circuit
courts and potentially responsible parties face when attempting to determine
liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA). Part II provides the reader with background
information on CERCLA, its provisions, and its amendments. Part III
analyzes the Supreme Court’s unpopular decision in Cooper Industries v.
Aviall Services, Inc., and that decision’s impact on CERCLA litigation.
Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify the Cooper
Industries decision in United States v. Atlantic Research Corporation and
the gaps left open by that decision. Part V studies how the circuit courts
have struggled with the gaps left open by the Supreme Court rulings,
especially when parties are facing consent decrees or administrative orders.
Lastly, Part VI brings the holdings of the cases discussed together in a
manner that can hopefully provide some guidance to parties facing potential
liability for a contaminated site.
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INTRODUCTION

With human health, environmental quality, and millions of dollars on
the line, parties trying to determine their liability pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) are forced to muddle through a perplexing piece of legislation
combined with unsettling Supreme Court precedent.
Two crucial
provisions of CERCLA, section 107 and section 113, determine a
potentially responsible party’s (PRP’s) ability to recover from other PRPs.
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The Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services1, turned
years of precedent on its head, drastically narrowing a PRP’s ability to
recover under a section 113 contribution claim. The Supreme Court
provided some guidance in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.2, but
left many questions unanswered, leaving the daunting task of interpreting
CERCLA’s liability provisions to the circuit courts, and PRPs baffled when
it comes to taking action upon discovering a contaminated site they may be
found liable for. Although navigating through CERCLA’s liability
provisions may be extremely frustrating, there are some steps a PRP can
take to minimize its liability while being able to recover some of its
incurred costs from other PRPs.
II. CERCLA BACKGROUND
CERCLA, also known as Superfund, was enacted to fill a gap in
environmental protection caused by our nation’s abandoned and/or inactive
hazardous waste sites.3 Passed in 1980, CERCLA became law after the
citizens of the United States witnessed the tragic events that unfolded in
Love Canal, New York.4 The passage of CERCLA is credited to the
homeowners in Niagara Falls and the news coverage that brought the Love
Canal incident and other hazardous waste sites around the nation into the
national limelight.5
Love Canal was anything but an isolated incident. In fact, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has suggested one in four
Americans lives within three miles of a Superfund site.6 The events at Love
Canal and other locations not only showed the “industry’s reckless

1. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
2. Ronald E. Cardwell, Comprehensive, Environmental, Response, and Liability Act, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 509 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 20th ed. 2009).
3. Id.
4. Veronica Eady Famira, Cleaning Up Abandoned or Inactive Contaminated Sites, in THE
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 570 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). From
approximately 1942-1954, Hooker Chemical company deposited approximately 25,000 tons of
chemical waste in a canal near a Niagara Falls community. ALLAN MAZUR, A HAZARDOUS
INQUIRY: THE RASHOMON EFFECT AT LOVE CANAL 9 (1998). The canal was eventually filled
and sold to the city to build an elementary school. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010). Families moved to the area not knowing of the
tremendous amount of toxic waste abutting their backyards. Id. The citizens became plagued
with numerous health problems and complained for years until President Carter declared a federal
emergency over what had become an “environmental ghetto.” Id. (citing S. REP NO. 96-848, at 810 (1980)).
5. MAZUR, supra note 4, at 217.
6. Famira, supra note 4, at 569.
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disregard for environmental safety over the years,”7 but also convinced
Congress that public health and the environment were at risk from
contaminant releases from uncontrolled or abandoned sites.8 At its passage,
CERCLA was viewed as an innovative tool to discover and clean up these
nasty toxic sites.9
CERCLA is commonly known as “Superfund” because the law created
a special tax on the petroleum and chemical industries to fund the cleaning
of hazardous waste sites.10 These funds are essential to ensure the prompt
cleanup of the sites, as the EPA can take action without first determining
who is liable for the contamination.11 Under CERCLA, the EPA is
authorized to take remedial action when “any hazardous substance is
released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment,”12 or when “there is a release or substantial threat of release
into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.”13
After the EPA cleans up a site, the agency can seek out those legally
responsible for the contamination and recover its costs.14 The EPA does not
have to conduct the initial cleanup itself however, and may subsequently
pursue a cost recovery action against those responsible. The EPA can also
order the parties responsible for the hazardous site(s), known as PRPs, to
clean up the site(s).15 Historically, CERCLA also allows “PRPs that [have]
incurred cleanup costs . . . to seek contribution from other parties through
collateral litigation.”16

7. Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 73 (2003).
8. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 509.
9. Famira, supra note 4, at 570.
10. Id. at 570. It is important to note that even though the petroleum industry was taxed to
support Superfund, “CERCLA excludes crude oil or any of its refined fractions from the definition
of hazardous substances.” Id. Caving to industry pressure, a Republican-led Congress allowed
the tax to expire in 2005, causing the funding for today’s Superfund cleanups to come from the
taxpayers. John M. Broder, Without Superfund Tax, Stimulus Aids Cleanups: $600 Million for
Work at Polluted Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A16.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006).
12. Id. § 9604(a)(1)(A).
13. Id. § 9604(a)(1)(B). The release of a substance can mean many things, including “any
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant).” Id. § 9601(22).
14. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
15. Famira, supra note 4, at 570.
16. Id.
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A. CRITICISMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF CERCLA
CERCLA is one of the most complex and daunting pieces of
environmental legislation.17 “For those unfamiliar with CERCLA law and
lore, finding, let alone understanding, CERCLA’s provisions can often be
difficult. Many of the procedures that apply in the typical CERCLA matter
are set forth in layers of statutory, regulatory, and policymaking
documents.”18 Such complexity logically leads to voluminous litigation.19
In fact, CERCLA is famous for being subject to “more litigation than any
other field of environmental law.”20
Criticisms of CERCLA do not end with its complexity. Industry has
criticized the law for being too strict and costly while many members of the
American public criticize the law for its slow pace of cleanup.21 Others
have stated the law has not lived up to its expectations to set America’s
hazardous waste problems right.22 Regardless of personal views regarding
CERCLA, one criticism is shared by all: the cost of cleanup is
tremendously expensive and intimidating.23
Even with all these criticisms, there is no doubt CERCLA has
significantly affected environmental policy.24 The EPA’s analysis of
CERCLA verifies its significant impact in cleaning up hazardous waste
sites around the country, resulting in improved public health and a cleaner
environment:
•EPA [through CERCLA] obligated nearly $443 million in
appropriated funds, state cost-share contributions, and potentially
17. 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[1][a], at 4A-23 (1998).
“CERCLA is a very complex piece of legislation, cross-referencing to, and relying on, prior laws
that deal with toxic and hazardous pollution. Moreover, the law had a stormy, contentious
legislative history that left its mark on a hurried and technically imperfect draft of legislation.”
Id.; 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES §
8.1, at 470, 474 (1992). “CERCLA is filled with the half-laws, teasers, and sleepers for which the
environmental statutes are famous.” RODGERS, supra, note 17 at 474.; Richard G. Opper,
Managing Risk at Brownfield Sites, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 32, 36 (2006). “We have seen
CERCLA grow from its poorly drafted roots into a cost-recovery statute that is so burdened by its
historic baggage that counsel for private cost-recovery plaintiffs have lost much of their
enthusiasm for the remedy.” Opper, supra, note 17.
18. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 512.
19. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 SUPERFUND AND BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP § 3:6 (2009-2008)
(“CERCLA has been a lawyer’s full-employment opportunity act.”).
20. GRAD, supra note 17, § 4A.01[5], at 4A-18.
21. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 510.
22. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND
ECONOMICS: RECLAIMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA 749 (2008).
23. MAZUR, supra note 4, at 218. “Superfund almost certainly is the most expensive
environmental program ever enacted.” Id.; Cardwell, supra note 3, at 510. “To many on both
sides of these issues, CERCLA has been an expensive failure.” Cardwell, supra note 2, at 510.
24. ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 22, at 749.
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responsible party settlement resources for construction and postconstruction projects . . . .
•EPA [through CERCLA] conducted 391 removal actions to
address immediate and substantial threats to communities . . . .
•[The EPA, through CERCLA] [p]laced 20 new sites on the
NPL,25 and proposed 8 sites to the NPL. The NPL had, at the end
of FY 2010, 61 proposed sites and 1,627 final and deleted
sites . . . .
•EPA [through CERCLA] secured private party commitments of
nearly $1.6 billion in FY 2010 to fund cleanup work . . . .26
The criticisms and impacts mentioned above are real and will
drastically affect a party who becomes involved with a Superfund site.27
Part of what makes CERCLA so complicated is determining who is going
to be held liable for the cleanup of these sites and, when there are multiple
PRPs at a contaminated site, how much each party is going to pay.28
Understanding the interaction between the varying liability provisions in
CERCLA is critical for all parties facing Superfund litigation.
B. THE LIABILITY PROVISIONS UNDER CERCLA
When determining liability and payment for the cleanup of hazardous
sites, it is important to remember the purpose of CERCLA, which is known
as the “polluter pays” principle.29 The polluter pays principle is “the idea
that those who benefited from their disregard [for the hazards posed by their
pollution] should now pay to clean up the mess.”30 CERCLA has listed

25. “The National Priorities List (“NPL”) is the list of national priorities among the known
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants throughout the
United States and its territories. The NPL is intended primarily to guide the EPA in determining
which sites warrant further investigation.”
National Priorities List (NPL), EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
26. Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2010, EPA, http://epa.gov/
superfund/accomp/numbers10 htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2012). See also Superfund Provides
Communities with Significant Human Health, Environmental and Economic Benefits, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/benefits htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2012) (explaining
CERCLA’s benefits “include reduction of threats to human health and ecological systems in the
vicinity of Superfund sites, improvement of the economic conditions and quality of life in
communities affected by hazardous waste sites, prevention of future releases of hazardous
substances, and advances in science and technology”).
27. See generally Opper, supra note 17, at 32, 36.
28. See generally Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 2011)
(explaining how the EPA ascertained one site’s contamination came from seven different source
areas).
29. Whitney, supra note 7, at 73.
30. Id.
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four broad categories of PRPs who can be found liable for the costs
associated with Superfund sites:
(1) the current owner or operator of a waste facility; (2) any
previous owner or operator during any time in which hazardous
substances were disposed at a waste facility; (3) any person who
arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the
waste facility; and (4) any person who transported hazardous
substances to a waste facility.31
Courts have found CERCLA imposes strict, joint, and several liability
among this broad categorization of PRPs.32 This means “[a]ny PRP may be
held responsible for the entire cost of cleanup, even if the PRP’s actual
contribution to the contamination is limited.”33 This feature of CERCLA
can have enormous significance to PRPs as the cost of cleaning up
Superfund sites have considerably increased with each passing year,34 often
times costing millions of dollars.35
1.

CERCLA Section 106

Section 106 of CERCLA36 grants the EPA the authority to mitigate any
“imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or
the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a facility.”37 Section 106 also details the available penalties
the EPA can levy on noncompliant parties.38 What makes section 106 such
a valuable tool for the EPA is that it allows the agency to issue “such orders
as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
31. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Centerior
Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 347 n.8 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2006))).
32. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 530.
33. Famira, supra note 4, at 571.
34. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 524.
35. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 164 (2004) (explaining how
one party “incurred approximately $5 million in cleanup costs; the total costs may be even
greater”); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 811 (1994) (detailing a settlement
where Key Tronic agreed to pay 4.2 million dollars to the EPA and the Air Force agreed to pay
1.45 million dollars); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 215 n.19 (3d
Cir. 2010) (listing the costs of five parties involved in the action, totaling $13,678,378.55); City of
Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing two settlements for site
cleanups totaling over thirty-eight million dollars).
36. Section 106 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006). For better readability, this Note will
refer to sections of CERCLA rather than the U.S. Code for the majority of the text. The footnotes
will point to the appropriate codified section.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). Section 106 actions are available only to the EPA and are not
available to private parties. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 551. Although section 106 is only
available to the EPA, it is the “second major cause of action available under CERCLA.” Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b).
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environment.”39 This means the EPA can direct a PRP, through a legally
binding administrative order, to abate a release of hazardous substances.40
The fines for willful noncompliance with an administrative order under
section 106 are steep – up to twenty-five thousand dollars per day.41
Further, if a party fails to comply with a section 106 administrative order,
that party may be subject to putative damages of three times the cleanup
costs incurred from the failure to take action.42 Given the power of the
order and the magnitude of the fees, it is no surprise section 106 is viewed
as “a valuable tool to commence cleanups promptly.”43
2.

CERCLA Section 107

The most litigious portion of CERCLA,44 section 107, categorizes the
four kinds of PRPs (listed above) and “permits the United States, individual
states, or private parties to bring an action [against a PRP] to recover costs
they have incurred in responding to a release or a threatened release of a
hazardous substance.”45 “Section 107(a) has a six-year statute of
limitations, and allows a plaintiff to recover 100% of its response costs
from all liable parties, including those which have settled their CERCLA
liability with the government.”46 Courts traditionally have applied section
107 to “innocent parties” who may have not taken part in the
contamination, but clean up the site anyway.47
Section 107 does not have an express right to contribution, which is a
different remedy than cost recovery.48 Contribution is defined as “[o]ne

39. Id. § 9606(a).
40. Famira, supra note 4, at 580.
41. 42. U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1).
42. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
43. Famira, supra note 4, at 581.
44. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 537.
45. Id.
46. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 551 U.S.
128 (2007). A “response cost” is any cost associated with a removal or remedial action.
Cardwell, supra note 2, at 547.
Specific examples of recoverable response costs include costs associated with
sampling and monitoring to assess and evaluate the extent of a release or threatened
release; costs associated with detecting, identifying, controlling, and disposing of
hazardous substances; and costs associated with investigating the extent of danger to
the public or environment.
Id. at 548. Costs that have been found not to be recoverable as response costs are “medical
monitoring costs, road repair and snow removal costs, and lost profits and general damages.” Id.
47. Randy J. Sutton, Innocent Owner Status under Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Annotation, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 161, 161 (2006).
48. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3 (2004). “The cost
recovery remedy of § 107(a)(4)(B) and the contribution remedy of § 113(f)(1) are similar at a
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tortfeasor’s right to collect from joint tortfeasors when – and to the extent
that – the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share to the
injured party, the shares being determined as percentages of causal fault.”49
Initially, courts filled this gap in the law by recognizing a common law
right to contribution claims between PRPs.50 Theoretically, without
recognizing a right to contribution, a PRP could be held liable for the
cleanup of an entire site (remember, courts have found CERCLA imposes
strict, joint, and several liability)51 and not be able to recover some of the
costs from other PRPs.52
3.

SARA Amendments and Section 113

In 1986, Congress recognized the hazardous sites around the country
were a larger problem than initially anticipated.53 It amended CERCLA in
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), adding 168
pages to the already complex CERCLA structure.54 The passage of SARA
“solidifie[d] the reputation of the field for complexity, obscurity, and mindnumbing detail.”55 Prior to the passage of SARA, courts read section
107(a)(4)(B) as creating “an implied right of action for contribution for
PRPs who had been sued under § 107, but had incurred response costs in
excess of their pro rata share.”56 SARA explicitly gave PRPs the right of
contribution:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section [107(a)] of this title,
during or following any civil action under section [106] of this title
or under section [107(a)] of this title . . . .
In resolving
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right
of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of
general level in that they both allow private parties to recoup costs from other private parties. But
the two remedies are clearly distinct.” Id.
49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (9th ed. 2009).
50. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir.
2010).
51. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 530.
52. See Niagara Mohawk, 596 U.S. at 121 n.8.
53. GRAD, supra note 17, § 4A.02[1][a], at 4A-23.
54. RODGERS, supra note 17, at 483. An interesting note for North Dakotans is that SARA
was signed by President Ronald Reagan on Air Force One over Grand Forks, North Dakota on
October 17, 1986. Id. at 484.
55. Id.
56. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998)).
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a civil action under section [106] of this title or section [107] of
this title.57
Section 113(f)(3)(B) also gave an explicit right of contribution to a
party who has “resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some or all
of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement.”58 In other words, if a
party enters into an administratively or judicially approved settlement with
the EPA regarding the cleanup of a site resolving its liability to the United
States, that party may pursue a contribution claim against other PRPs.59
The right of contribution is limited to a three-year statute of limitations,60
which is considerably shorter than section 107’s six-year statute of
limitations.61 Section 113(f)(2) also gave parties an incentive to enter into
an administratively or judicially approved settlement: by entering into such
settlements, a PRP cannot be held “liable for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”62
Although explicitly inserting the right of contribution into CERCLA
may have been well intentioned, it added complexity and opaqueness to the
law.63 Numerous questions arose with the newly passed legislation;
specifically, one major question arose as to whether a PRP can seek
contribution from another PRP for cleanup costs when no civil action has
been brought under section 106 or section 107.64 “Most courts of appeals
[initially] interpreted section 113(f)(1) broadly and allowed PRPs to sue
other PRPs to recover cleanup costs at any time after cleanup costs were
incurred.”65
III. COOPER INDUSTRIES CHANGES THE LANDSCAPE
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. drastically limited the
ability of PRPs to bring section 113 contribution claims against other
PRPs.66
Cooper Industries involved contaminated aircraft engine
maintenance sites in Texas.67 In 1981, Cooper Industries (Cooper), who

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006).
Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
See id.
Id. § 9613(g)(1).
Id. § 9613(g)(2)(B).
Id. § 9613(f)(2).
RODGERS, supra note 17, at 484-86.
Cardwell, supra note 2, at 567.
Id.
Cardwell, supra note 2, at 567.
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004).
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had previously operated the sites, sold them to Aviall Services (Aviall).68
After years of operation, Aviall discovered some facilities were
contaminated by petroleum and other hazardous substances leaking “into
the ground and ground water through underground storage tanks and
spills.”69
Aviall contacted the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission, who informed Aviall it was in violation of state
environmental laws and directed Aviall to clean up the site.70 The
Commission threatened action if Aviall did not clean up the site, but neither
it nor the EPA brought any action compelling cleanup.71 In 1997, Aviall
brought suit against Cooper, seeking to recover its cleanup costs.72 The
question before the Court was whether a party who has not been sued under
section 106 or section 107 is able to pursue a contribution claim against
another party pursuant to section 113.73
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas doggedly stuck to a textualist
approach in his interpretation of the CERCLA provisions.74 Justice Thomas
evaluated the enabling clause of section 113(f), which states, “[a]ny person
may seek contribution . . . during or following any civil action under” either
section 106 or section 107 of CERCLA.75 Instead of following the judicial
canon norm of reading the word “may” as granting discretion to the
aggrieved party,76 Justice Thomas declared the word “may” authorizes
action only when it has satisfied “the subsequent specified condition.”77
Put another way, the only way a PRP (Aviall) could seek a section 113

68. Id.
69. Id. at 163-64.
70. Id. at 164.
71. Id.
72. Id. “[The] claim alleged that, pursuant to § 113(f)(1), Aviall was entitled to seek
contribution from Cooper, as a PRP under § 107(a), for response costs and other liability Aviall
incurred in connection with the Texas facilities.” Id.
73. Id. at 160-61.
74. Textualism is roughly defined as a method of statutory interpretation in which a judge
looks to the statute’s literal text to interpret the law, as opposed to looking into the legislative
history, legislative implications, or equitable considerations in interpretation. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1614, 356 (9th ed. 2009).
75. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)
(2006)).
76. ROBERT J. MATINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND RULE
DRAFTING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 49 (2005). If there is to be a limitation on the discretionary act,
then the limitation should include the world “only.” Id. For example, if Congress intended to
limit the availability of section 113, it would have looked like this: “A person may only seek
contribution . . . during or following any civil action.” See id.
77. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166.
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contribution claim from another party (Cooper) is if that PRP (Aviall) has
already been sued under section 106 or section 107.78
Justice Thomas limited the decision by choosing not to address whether
a party who is subject to a judicial order under section 106 constitutes a
PRP being subject to a “civil action” to which it can bring section 113
contribution claims against other PRPs.79 Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justice Stevens, dissented from the Court’s majority holding, stating
“[f]ederal courts, prior to the enactment of § 113(f)(1), had correctly held
that PRPs could recover [under § 107] a proportionate share of their costs in
actions for contribution against other PRPs [and] nothing in § 113 retracts
that right.”80
Before Cooper Industries, the long-standing practice across the country
was to allow a party who was not subject to section 106 or section 107
litigation to bring a claim for contribution under section 113(f)(1) against
other PRPs to recover the costs it voluntarily undertook to clean up a
contaminated site.81 The decision in Cooper Industries was roundly
criticized by commentators because it essentially discouraged parties from
voluntarily cleaning up these sites until getting sued to do so,82 which goes
against CERCLA’s goal of “facilitat[ing] the prompt cleanup of hazardous
waste sites.”83 The decision was also criticized for leaving open many
unanswered questions, particularly whether a PRP can bring a section 107
cost recovery action against another PRP at the same site,84 as pointed out
in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.85 These questions remained unanswered for
years, leaving PRPs with a difficult decision: voluntarily clean up the site
and hope a court allows a section 107 cost recovery action, or wait to get
sued and potentially face the increased costs and penalties of delaying the
cleanup.86

78. Id. at 160-61.
79. Id. at 168 n.5.
80. Id. at 174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
81. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 567.
82. Famira, supra note 4, at 580; Joseph Ferrucci, No Contribution Claims for Voluntary
Cleanup of Superfund Sites: The Troubling Supreme Court Decision in Cooper Industries v.
Aviall Services, 12 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 73, 95 (2005); Armand M. Perry,
Will the Legislative Branch Please Stand Up: Ending Three Years of Uncertainty in a PostCooper World, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 407, 421 (2007).
83. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir.
1997).
84. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 568.
85. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
86. See Perry, supra note 82, at 421-22.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. ATLANTIC RESEARCH’S GUIDANCE
Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., courts were struggling with understanding the relationship
between section 113(f) contribution and section 107(a) cost recovery caused
by the Cooper Industries decision.87 Nearly three years after Cooper
Industries, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify its prior
decision.
Atlantic Research involved a site where the Atlantic Research
Corporation (Atlantic Research) retrofitted rocket motors for the United
States government.88 Wastewater and burned fuel from the operation
contaminated the soil and groundwater at the site.89 Atlantic Research
voluntarily cleaned up the site (without being subject to section 106 or
section 107 litigation) and brought suit against the United States under
section 107(a) to recover its costs for cleanup.90
Justice Thomas, this time writing for a unanimous Court, explained
how “§§ 107(a) and 113(f) provides two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies:”91
Section 113(f) explicitly grants PRPs a right to contribution . . . .
By contrast, § 107(a) permits recovery of cleanup costs but does
not create a right to contribution. A private party may recover
under § 107(a) without any establishment of liability to a third
party. Moreover, § 107(a) permits a PRP to recover only the costs
it has “incurred”92 in cleaning up a site. When a party pays to
satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment, it does not
incur its own costs of response. Rather, it reimburses other parties
for costs that those parties incurred.93
Justice Thomas further explained that it is the procedural circumstances
of the parties involved that will determine whether section 107(a) or section
87. GRAD, supra note 17, § 4A.02[1][g-1], at 4A-78.24(5)-(6).
88. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 133 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Id. Atlantic Research amended its complaint, after the Supreme Court’s Cooper
Industries decision, from seeking relief under sections 107(a) and 113(f) to seeking relief under
section 107(a) and the federal common law. Id. “The United States moved to dismiss, arguing
that § 107(a) does not allow PRPs (such as Atlantic Research) to recover costs.” Id. at 133-34.
91. Id. at 138 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3
(2004)).
92. Justice Thomas focused on the express language in section 107(a)(4)(B), which states
that a PRP shall be liable for “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis
added). The national contingency plan is the federal government’s plan for responding to releases
of hazardous substances. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112,
121 (2d Cir. 2010).
93. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138-39 (internal citations omitted).
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113(f) will apply.94 If a party is subject to section 106 or section 107
litigation, then section 113(f) is that party’s vehicle for bringing a
contribution action.95 On the other hand, if a party is not subject to section
106 or section 107 litigation, then section 107(a) is that party’s vehicle to
bring an action against a PRP for the costs it incurred from the cleanup.96
Of particular relevance, Justice Thomas then distinguished (presumably
innocent) parties who voluntarily clean up a site from parties who are
paying money to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment.97
Those parties who enter into settlement agreements are not in the same
procedural posture as those who voluntarily clean up a site. “[B]y
reimbursing response costs paid by other parties, the PRP has not incurred
its own costs of response and therefore cannot recover under § 107(a),”
leaving them to only pursue a section 113 contribution claim.98 However,
Justice Thomas acknowledged that entering into a consent decree or
administrative order under section 106 and section 107 is not the same as
entering into a settlement agreement. “In such a case, the PRP does not
incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another party.”99
Even though the opinion recognizes this gap in the law, it inexplicably
states in a footnote it will not decide the issue.100
Although Atlantic Research resolves some of the issues created by
Cooper Industries, it leaves a massive gap in the law for those parties
incurring costs stemming from administrative orders and settlements, which
is a common scenario at Superfund sites.101 It is the commonality of
consent decrees and administrative orders under CERCLA that makes this
decision so odd. “The EPA has issued more than 1,700 orders [compelling
environmental cleanup] since CERCLA’s enactment in 1980. That large
number is not surprising given that [administrative orders] are ‘one of the
most potent administrative remedies available to the [EPA] under any
existing environmental statute.’”102 The issue has not been revisited by the

94. Id. at 139.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 139 n.6.
100. See id.
101. Aselda Thompson, Exposing a Gap in CERCLA Case Law: Is there a Right to Recover
Costs Following Compliance with an Administrative Order after Atlantic and Aviall?, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 1679, 1699-1700 (2010).
102. Id. at 1688-89 (quoting EPA, Guidance Memorandum on Use and Issuance of
Administrative Orders under Section 106(a) of CERCLA 1 (Sept. 8, 1983)).

2012]

NOTE

223

Supreme Court, leaving the circuit courts to wade through the mud that is
CERCLA liability.103
V. CIRCUIT COURTS SORT THROUGH THE MESS
A. SIXTH CIRCUIT
One of the first cases to reach the appellate level dealing with
administrative orders after Atlantic Research was ITT Industries, Inc. v.
BorgWarner, Inc.104 ITT Industries dealt with two sites contaminated with
trichloroethylene (TCE) in Michigan, which the EPA placed on the
National Priorities List.105 ITT Industries, Inc. (ITT) voluntarily entered
into an Administrative Order by Consent (AOC) with the EPA to conduct a
study to determine the source of TCE at one site (NBFF site). 106 ITT
incurred approximately two million dollars in costs in connection with the
NBFF site.107
Without admitting liability, ITT entered into a Consent Decree at
another site (NBIA site) with other parties to perform the required remedial
actions necessary to clean up the site.108 ITT incurred approximately $1.6
million in costs in connection with the NBIA site.109 ITT brought suit
against BorgWarner and other defendants for cost recovery under section
107(a) and contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B).110
The Sixth Circuit discussed the tenuous history of section 107 and
section 113 claims and reiterated that “the appropriateness of a § 107(a)
cost recovery or § 113(f) contribution action varies depending on the
circumstances leading up to the action, not the identity of the parties.”111
103. “[N]avigating the interplay between § 107(a) and § 113(f) remains a deeply difficult
task. ‘[R]ecent rulings have done little to provide the lower courts with useful guidance in
determining which subsection of CERCLA provides a cause of action for parties seeking
reimbursement of response costs in differing situations.’” Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl.
Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted) (quoting New York v.
Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F. Supp.2d 357, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)).
104. 506 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2008). Technically, the Third Circuit heard a case dealing with
administrative orders and section 107 and section 113 recovery first, but that case was not selected
for publication in the Federal Reporter. Montville Township v. Woodmont Builders, LLC, 244 F.
App’x 514 (3d Cir. 2007).
105. ITT Indus., 506 F.3d at 454. The contamination stemmed from the manufacture of
fishing reels. Id.
106. Id. at 455.
107. Id.
108. Id. “The NBIA Site consists of a series of lagoons, an industrial sewer, and a country
drain located approximately one-half mile from the NBFF site.” Id.
109. Id. ITT claimed BorgWarner was responsible for some of the response costs for
discharges of hazardous substances into the lagoons and a country drain. Id.
110. Id. at 454.
111. Id. at 458.
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Citing Atlantic Research, the Sixth Circuit noted a section 107 claim may
be pursued when a PRP has “incurred” the cleanup costs on its own (and is
not reimbursing other parties), whereas a section 113 claim may be pursued
when a PRP has been subject to a section 106 or section 107 action, or has
“entered into a judicially or administratively approved settlement.”112 At
first glance, this would make one think the AOC constitutes a judicially or
administratively approved settlement, allowing ITT to bring its section 113
claim.
However, after reviewing the AOC, the Sixth Circuit determined ITT
did not resolve its liability with the United States, as is required to move
forward on a section 113(f)(3)(B) claim.113 ITT did voluntarily enter into
the AOC with the EPA, but that agreement expressly reserved the EPA with
the “rights to legal action to adjudicate [ITT’s] liability for failure to
comply with the AOC, for costs of response (past, present, or future), for
costs of injunctive relief or enforcement, criminal liability, and other
damages.”114 Further, ITT repeatedly made clear that its entering into the
AOC in no way was an indication of liability on its behalf.115 The
availability of a contribution claim hinges on a party resolving its
liability;116 therefore, by repeatedly denying liability, ITT essentially closed
the door for its section 113 contribution claim.117
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine if
ITT could pursue a section 107 cost recovery action.118 Looking again to
Atlantic Research, the Sixth Circuit stated “CERCLA provides PRPs with a
cause of action to recover costs incurred from remedial action regarding a
contaminated site under § 107(a).”119 Punting the issue, the Sixth Circuit
stated it had “no opinion as to how [ITT’s] cost recovery action ultimately
should be resolved. Rather, we leave it to the district court to entertain this
question in light of Atlantic Research.”120
112. Id. (citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007)).
113. Id. at 459.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 460.
116. 42. U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2006).
117. ITT Indus., 506 F.3d at 460. The Sixth Circuit also stated the AOC in this case was
entered into under section 122(a), which essentially gives the EPA the right to allow a PRP to
perform a response action if the agency determines that party will do the action appropriately. Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)). In order for a settlement to be considered “an administratively or
judicially approved settlement,” ITT would have had to enter into the AOC pursuant to section
122(h) or section 122(g), which relate to de minimus settlements and cost recovery settlements,
respectively. Id. The Sixth Circuit came to this conclusion by evaluating how the Supreme Court
used those sections to discern the applicability of section 113. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 458.
120. Id. at 460.
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B. SECOND CIRCUIT
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,121 a case that is “yet another in a series of cases that
attempt to chart the contours of liability” of PRPs under section 107 and
section 113.122 This case involved Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
(NiMo) voluntarily entering into an AOC with New York’s Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC).123 Unlike the AOC in ITT Industries,
NiMo’s AOC explicitly stated it had “resolved its liability to the State for
purposes of contribution protection provided by CERCLA Section
113(f)(2).”124 NiMo brought suit against numerous defendants to recoup its
costs.125
The Second Circuit determined section 113 is the only available claim
for NiMo.126 The factual background behind the AOC agreement supports
a section 113 claim, as NiMo accepted responsibility and paid for the
response costs associated with the cleanup.127 Recognizing Congress
explicitly added section 113 contribution claims in SARA, the Second
Circuit stated that allowing “NiMo to proceed under § 107(a) would in
effect nullify the SARA amendment and abrogate the requirements
Congress placed on contribution claims under § 113.”128
The opinion then explained the rationale behind letting PRPs, such as
NiMo, have a right to contribution:
Congress sought to further incentivize PRPs to pay for their role in
the creation of a hazardous waste site regardless of when they
polluted. To that end, parties seeking contribution-by definition
PRPs who have already been charged with liability and resolved
their exposure . . . -must be granted sufficient opportunity to
pursue other PRPs and have the costs of cleanup borne equitably
with others liable under the statute.129
The rule of law that emerges from Niagara Mohawk is that when a
PRP sustains remediation costs under an AOC with a State, that PRP may
pursue a section 113 contribution action against other PRPs as long as the
AOC contains explicit language releasing the section 113 action bringing
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010).
Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 117-18.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 132 (internal citations omitted).
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PRP from CERCLA liability.130 Comparing this case to ITT Industries, it is
clear how crucial the language of an AOC can be. Without such language,
the client can be stuck without a claim as in ITT Industries;131 however,
when explicit language in the AOC resolves liability, like it did in Niagara
Mohawk, the client can move forward on a section 113 contribution
claim,132 potentially recovering millions of dollars.
C. THIRD CIRCUIT
In a case that dealt with “the disposal of millions of gallons of toxic
waste, over a six year time period, by more than twenty parties, with
millions of dollars of cleanup costs at stake,” the Third Circuit came to a
slightly different conclusion regarding PRP recovery suits in Agere
Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Environmental Technology Corp.133 After the
EPA determined the contaminated site, the Boarhead Site, was to be a
Superfund site, it commenced a section 107 cost recovery suit against
multiple parties.134 That litigation ended in a Consent Decree where the
PRPs were to do the cleanup work and reimburse the EPA for the costs
connected with the cleanup.135 Agere was neither a party to the section 107
action nor the Consent Decree, but it did enter into a private settlement with
the parties of the Consent Decree.136 At the time the case was decided,
Agere had contributed $902,152.49 towards the cleanup.137 Agere and the
members of the Consent Decree brought suit against twenty-three other
defendants seeking to recoup the costs of the cleanup at the Boarhead
Site.138
The Third Circuit recognized Agere’s unique position, as it had not
been subject to section 106 or section 107 proceedings, nor had it entered
into an administratively or judicially approved settlement, which would
technically bar Agere from pursuing a section 113 contribution claim

130. Id. at 124-25, 140. Cf. W.R. Grace & Co-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 91 (2d
Cir. 2009) (ruling that a PRP cannot bring a section 113 contribution claim when its settlement
with the DEC made no reference to CERCLA, stated the settlement only handled state law claims,
and left open the possibility that the DEC or the EPA could bring CERCLA or other claims).
131. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 460 (6th Cir. 2007).
132. Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 125-26.
133. 602 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).
134. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 211-12.
135. Id. at 212-13.
136. Id. at 213.
137. Id. at 224.
138. Id. at 213-14. Agere and the other plaintiffs brought suit for both cost recovery and
contribution. Id.
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pursuant to Cooper Industries.139 Relying on the precedent in Atlantic
Research, the Third Circuit determined Agere had “incurred” costs in
cleaning up the site.140
Agere . . . put their money in the pot right along with the money
from the signers of the consent decrees. The costs they paid for
were incurred at the same time as the costs incurred by the signers
of the consent decrees and for the same work. Those costs were
incurred in the ordinary sense that a bill one obligates oneself to
pay comes due as a job gets done.141
The Third Circuit explained if it were to hold Agere did not have a
section 107 claim, it would be completely barred from seeking recovery,
which would go against CERCLA’s goal of encouraging parties to
promptly clean up hazardous sites and later be able to recover from other
parties for the cleanup.142 “When a company in the position of
Agere . . . has not yet been sued by the EPA but appreciates that it bears
some responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste, the language of
CERCLA, which is intended to encourage cleanup, ought not be interpreted
to discourage participation in cleanup.”143 Allowing parties like Agere to
recover the costs it incurred to help pay for a cleanup from other parties
encourages participation in environmental cleanups, even if those costs are
associated with a private party settlement obligation.144
The Third Circuit also ruled the other plaintiffs in the case, those who
entered into the consent decrees with the EPA, were not able to pursue a
section 107 cost recovery claim.145 Section 113(f)(2) shields parties who
enter into settlements with the government from other contribution claims
over issues relating to the settlement.146 If the court allowed a section 107
claim in such a circumstance, the defendant PRP would be unable to bring a
contribution claim and would be held fully liable under CERCLA’s joint
and several liability.147 The Third Circuit says such an outcome would be

139. Id. at 225-26. Cooper Industries held a party can only seek a contribution claim from
other PRPs if it has been subject to section 106 or section 107 litigation. Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 160-61 (2004).
140. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225. “[Section] 107(a) permits a PRP to recover only the
costs it has ‘incurred’ in cleaning up a site.” United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128,
139 (2007).
141. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225.
142. Id. at 226.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 229.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006).
147. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 229.
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perverse, stating, “while joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to
collect from a single defendant the collective liability of all defendants, it
does not permit a plaintiff to recover from a defendant the costs to undo
what the plaintiff itself has done.”148 Therefore, the proper action for
plaintiffs who have entered into administrative or judicially approved
settlements is a section 113 contribution claim.149
D. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
One of the more recent cases involving CERCLA liability under
section 107 and section 113 was heard by the Eighth Circuit in Morrison
Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corp.150 After the EPA discovered a
contaminated water production well in Nebraska, it contacted Morrison
Enterprises (Morrison), the City of Hastings (City), and the Dravo
Corporation (Dravo) to inform them they were potentially liable for the
contamination.151
The EPA “determined that three of the sources for the contamination
were a grain elevator operated by one of Morrison’s predecessors, a
manufacturing plant run by Dravo, and a city landfill.”152 The EPA entered
into a series of AOCs and consent decrees with the City and Morrison that
ultimately led to the parties extracting and treating groundwater that was
contaminated with their contaminants of concern (COCs) as well as TCE,
even though Morrison claimed to have never used or released TCE.153 The
EPA also entered into a consent decree with Dravo to clean up its TCE
contamination at another sub-site.154 Morrison and the City brought suit
under both section 107 and section 113 against Dravo to recover their costs
of cleaning up the TCE.155
The Eighth Circuit determined neither Morrison nor the City can
pursue a section 107 cost recovery claim.156 The court stated that unlike the
voluntary plaintiff in Atlantic Research, who had not been subject to section
106 or section 107 litigation, both Morrison and the City had been subject
to such litigation.157
“Response costs incurred pursuant
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
(2011).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 229.
Id.
638 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2011).
Morrison Enters. LLC, 638 F.3d at 599.
8th Circuit Rejects Cost-Recovery Action for Involuntary Cleanup, 31 No. 21 WJENV 2
Morrison Enters. LLC, 638 F.3d at 599-601.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 604.
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to . . . administrative settlements following a suit under § 106 or § 107(a)
are not incurred voluntarily.”158
The court acknowledged the TCE at Dravo’s site migrated to the other
sites, but held Morrison and the City were still liable for the entire cleanup:
Under CERCLA, if a responsible party . . . releases hazardous
materials into the environment, and that release causes the
incurrence of response costs, then the party is liable . . . for any
other necessary cost of response incurred by any other person . . . .
When multiple parties are liable for response costs, the focus then
shifts to allocation.159
The Eighth Circuit reasoned Morrison, the City, and Dravo all shared
liability for contaminating the groundwater with various contaminants, and
therefore, all three shared liability for cleaning up the contamination, both
theirs and others.160 Although the Eighth Circuit definitively ruled entering
into AOCs bars cost recovery under section 107, it clearly allowed for
plaintiffs who have entered into AOCs to use section 113, as “[t]his shared
liability is sufficient to support a § 113(f) contribution claim.”161
VI. LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD
A. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
If the reader is confused about exactly where the line is drawn between
section 107 and section 113, he or she should not be surprised. Judges and
commentators openly admit understanding the relationship between section
107 and section 113 is extremely difficult.162 However, after evaluating all
the cases discussed above, legal practitioners and scholars can potentially
understand the evolution of CERCLA liability under section 107 and
section 113.
The Supreme Court, in Cooper Industries, stated a PRP who has not
been subject to a section 106 or section 107 suit may not bring a
contribution claim under section 113, changing years of lower court
precedent and practice.163 It followed that ruling three years later with

158. Id.
159. Id. at 605 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
160. Id. at 606-07.
161. Id. at 607.
162. Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2010).
“[N]avigating the interplay between § 107(a) and § 113(f) remains a deeply difficult task.” Id.
163. Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157,160-61 (2004).
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Atlantic Research, which stated a party who voluntarily cleans up a site can
pursue a cost recovery action under section 107.164
The Sixth Circuit, in ITT Industries, stated a party who enters into an
AOC without admitting or resolving liability cannot bring a section 113
contribution claim.165 The Second Circuit, in Niagara Mohawk, ruled a
settlement agreement that explicitly states a party has resolved its liability
to the State (or the EPA) qualifies that PRP to bring section 113
contribution claims against other PRPs.166 The Third Circuit, in Agere
Systems, determined that allowing a party who has entered into private
settlement agreements (not with the government) to pursue section 107 cost
recovery actions promotes the goals of CERCLA.167 Finally, the Eighth
Circuit, in Morrison Enterprises, ruled that entering into an AOC
essentially bars a PRP from pursuing a section 107 cost recovery action,
and the only action available is a section 113 contribution claim.168
B. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Most commentators agree that although the Supreme Court has been
placed in a tough spot of interpreting a poorly drafted statute, it has failed
“to clarify the statute and thereby give direct guidance to [PRPs].”169 This
leaves the circuit courts and PRPs to discern the proper interpretation of the
statute in allocating liability. For the time being, it is the circuit courts who
bear the responsibility to determine the interplay between section 107 and
section 113.
1.

(Lack of) Legislative Response Potential

Unfortunately, any hope of fixing the statutory language of CERCLA,
as amended by SARA, through the legislative branch is unrealistic. What
was supposed to be a quick passage of SARA in 1986 turned into a
dramatic storyline involving “prolonged bouts of stalemate, gamesmanship,
bluffs, threats,” threats of pocket veto, and Congress pledging to stay in
164. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135-36 (2007).
165. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 459-60 (6th Cir. 2007).
166. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126-28, 140 (2d
Cir. 2010).
167. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225-26.
168. Morrison Enters., LLC, v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 604 (8th Cir. 2011). “[A] PRP
can bring a claim under § 107(a) if it is foreclosed from bringing a claim under § 113(f), but that,
conversely, a PRP must proceed under § 113(f) if § 113(f) is available to it.” Morrison Enters.,
LLC v. Dravo Corp., No. 4:08CV3142, 2009 WL 4330224 at *8 (D. Neb. Nov. 24, 2009).
169. Thompson, supra note 101, at 1706-07; O’REILLY, supra note 19, § 3:6. “Two
Supreme Court opinions by Justice Clarence Thomas have been the source of much of the worst
confusion and, to be frank, have caused years of wasted effort in the evolution of Superfund law.”
Id.
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session to override any veto.170 Furthering the Congressional drama, in
1995, the Republican-led Congress discontinued the tax on the petroleum
and chemical industries, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill for the Superfund
cleanups.171 CERCLA’s stormy past combined with the American public’s
extremely low opinion of Congress today,172 leaves little hope the
legislative branch will do anything to bring clarification to the law.
2.

Using Circuit Court Precedent

Easier said than done, a PRP needs to take a hard look at its past, its
predecessors’ past, and determine the plausibility that it may have
contributed to the contamination. If it has contributed, it should
immediately take actions to abate such contamination. Not only is this the
morally superior thing to do, it makes business and financial sense for the
PRP. Taking prompt action avoids steep statutory penalties and will allow
that PRP to have some recourse against other PRPs, either through section
107 or section 113.
Although each case regarding CERCLA liability will undoubtedly be
filled with complexities in both the facts and the law, and there is no
guarantee of action by Congress or the Supreme Court, a PRP can take
affirmative steps in the light of some circuit court precedent. If a PRP
recognizes it bears some responsibility for the contamination at a site, yet is
lucky enough to not be subject section 106 or section 107 litigation, it may
still enter into private settlements with PRPs who are subject to such
litigation.173 That PRP may pursue cost recovery actions against those
parties who have not entered into such agreements, while the parties subject
to section 106 or section 107 litigation can bring contribution claims against
those PRPs who decided not to engage in the settlements or the cleanup.174
If a PRP finds itself subject to section 106 or section 107 action
brought by either the State or the EPA and determines it will make good
business sense to enter into a settlement or AOC, admitting liability and
expressly stating the liability has been resolved allows a party to bring a
section 113 claim against other parties and shields those parties from other
section 113 claims.175 Although entering into an AOC will close the
170. RODGERS, supra note 17, at 483-84.
171. Broder, supra note 10, at A16.
172. Chris Cillizza, Congress’ Approval Problem in One Chart, WASH. POST (Nov. 15,
2011, 12:09 PM ET), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/congress-approvalproblem-in-one-chart/2011/11/15/gIQAkHmtON_blog.html.
173. Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2010).
174. Id. at 228-29.
175. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126-28, 140 (2d
Cir. 2010). Although there is some concern a party who enters into an administratively or
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possibility to recover one hundred percent of the costs incurred by the PRP,
it allows that PRP to pursue contribution claims against other PRPs,
potentially being able to recover millions of dollars.176
If a PRP is found subject to litigation under section 106 or section 107,
it behooves that PRP to enter into a settlement to avoid further liability (the
prompt cleanup). The current state of the law does not allow for a one
hundred percent recovery of cleanup costs if a party has been subject to
section 106 or section 107 litigation, as that would defeat the “polluter
pays” principle.177 Instead, the proper course is for that PRP to seek out
other PRPs under a section 113 contribution claim, ensuring all parties who
are liable pay for their fair share of the contamination.
For the most part, the holdings of the circuit courts, while bound to the
textualist precedent of the Supreme Court, have been able to utilize
CERCLA’s goals of promoting the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites
and the “polluter pays” principle.178 Until common sense at the Supreme
Court or Congressional level returns an implied right of contribution under
section 107, as Justice Ginsburg suggests,179 circuit courts should take an
extra effort to follow, to the extent they can, CERCLA’s goals of ensuring
parties responsible for the contamination clean up the contamination as
quickly as possible while ensuring that all parties liable for the
contamination pay their fair share in the cost of remediation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The landscape surrounding CERCLA liability is constantly in a state of
flux. Supreme Court precedent in Atlantic Research and Cooper Industries
judicially approved settlement may still be subject to a section 107 cost recovery claim, that
settling party can counterclaim with section 113 for contribution. Elizabeth E. Mack & Angela D.
Hodges, LAW 360, Settling CERCLA Section 107 Claims (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.lockelord.com/files/News/d5a8d743-f590-423d-b45b-29502cc6042f/Presentation/
NewsAttachment/5f943a19-9f75-425f-96ac-2b35f9b105d4/2009-02_SettlingCERCLASection107
Claims_MackHodges.pdf. Odds are that since the EPA has already calculated the settling PRP’s
fair share in its settlement that a section 107 plaintiff is going to have a very difficult time
showing the settling party should pay more. Id. “Accordingly, if the settlement otherwise makes
good business sense, the gap in contribution protection should not be a disincentive to
settlement. . . . The imperfect world of contribution protection after Atlantic Research should not
deter settlements that otherwise make good business sense.” Id.
176. Morrison Enters., LLC, v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 604 (8th Cir. 2011).
177. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 229.
178. Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 130-31 (using the two main goals of CERCLA in its
analysis: “remediation of sites that present a clear and present danger to the health and well-being
of the communities in which they are located and identification of the source, or sources, of [the]
hazardous materials.”); Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225 (stating the thought that “the Supreme
Court did not intend to deprive the word ‘incurred’ of its ordinary meaning” in its decision in
Atlantic Research).
179. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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changed the contours of PRP liability suits significantly. The current status
of determining CERCLA liability under section 107 and section 113 is
anything but clear or ideal, but if Congress or the Supreme Court were to
embark on transforming the current statutory landscape, history warns that
they may well make things worse. PRPs, while stuck in a difficult situation
regarding action upon the discovery of a contaminated site, can take some
action under circuit court precedent to minimize its liability to other parties
and, if the facts support their position, seek out either section 107 cost
recovery claims or section 113 contribution from PRPs.
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